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ChinaWith the rapid expansion of the high-speed railway infrastructure in China, conflicts arise
between the interests of local citizens living along the planned tracks and the national
interests of governmental authorities and project developers. This paper addresses ques-
tions of why and how Chinese citizens mobilize for and participate in protests against
high-speed railway projects and to what effect. To this end, a comprehensive study was
conducted on the decision-making process, public opinions, and protest actions regarding
the plans and site choices for the Beijing–Shenyang high-speed railway from 2008 to 2013,
combining quantitative and qualitative methods. In general, local residents are supportive
of high-speed railway project construction, but they contest the closed decision-making
process and the poor design and siting choices for the track by governmental authorities
and companies. After four years of resident protests through formal complaints, lobbying,
protest demonstrations, organizing alternative opinion polls, and discussions with author-
ities, citizens were partially successful in changing the siting of the track, adding protective
measures (e.g., tunnels and sound screens), and saving green belts. Two conclusions can be
drawn from this case study. First, regardless of the growing legal requirements, public par-
ticipation in major projects in China is far from a standard practice. Final citizen participa-
tion is often preceded by serious conflict. Second, with defined good governance
boundaries, there is increasing room for public participation in environmental movements,
which does influence final decisions.
 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.Introduction
High-speed railways (HSRs), with an average speed above 200 km/h, were developed more than fifty years ago, first in
Japan in the 1960s, then in France in the 1980s, and later in Spain, Germany, the UK, the US, China, and other countries. Ever
since the birth of high-speed railway, public concerns and protests have emerged in almost all countries along the tracks of
high-speed rail. These actions focused especially on the intrusion into local communities, engineering and financial risks,
significant land-use changes with consequences for landscapes and biodiversity, top-down planning with limited or no pos-
sibilities for participation and co-decisions, and environmental and human health consequences of HSR operation (Schaap,
1996; De Carlo, 2006; Della Porta and Piazza, 2007; Marincioni and Appiotti, 2009; Fedi et al., 2012; Novy and Peters, 2013;
2 G. He et al. / Transportation Research Part D 43 (2016) 1–16Teo and Loosemore, 2014). These concerns and organized protests of local citizens and residents have caused significant
delays and overspending, following lengthy procedures and additional infrastructure requirements (Lastrico, 2012). How-
ever, in many countries, policy-makers, infrastructure planners, and construction companies have learned how to cope,
address, and partly prevent the concerns, protests, and distrust of local citizens and communities during the planning, imple-
mentation, and operation of high-speed railways (Cascetta and Pagliara, 2013; Kaufmann et al., 2008; Leheis, 2012; Rozema
et al., 2015). Over the last decade, we have seen extensive efforts from authorities, including information provisions; public
consultations; broader and more institutionalized involvement of citizens, communities, and NGOs; institutionalization of
environmental dispute resolution; and the development and implementation of multiple alternative trajectories and costly
plan adaptations (Della Porta and Andretta, 2002; De Carlo, 2006; Marincioni and Appiotti, 2009).
China started construction on HSR a decade ago, with large investments in and the rapid expansion of high-speed railway
transport infrastructure for economic and regional development. The 12th Five-Year Plan (2011–2015) formulated a target of
40,000 km of fast-speed railway track by 2015. However, the July 2011Wenzhou high-speed train incident shook public con-
fidence in the HSR system. It resulted in the subsequent prosecution for corruption of top railway officials, a substantial revi-
sion of planned expenditures, and the temporary suspension of the construction of new rail building. In response to fraud
and wasted funds, the State Council carried out an institutional reform on March 10, 2013. The reform dissolved the former
Ministry of Railways (MOR) and its duties were taken up by the Ministry of Transport (MOT, developing plans and policy),
the State Railways Administration (SRA, for technical standards and safety inspection), and the China Railway Corporation
(CRC, for construction and management of services). Despite these medium-term difficulties, the long-term fundamentals
of high-speed railway development in China appear unchanged. As of December 2013, China has the world’s longest HSR
network with 11,000 km of routes in service. By April 2014, the China Rail Sector raised the fixed asset investment budget
for rail for 2014 to RMB 800 billion (129 billion US dollars) and increased the number of projects from 44 to 64.
More recently, in China, not unlike other countries, environmental and health consequences and impacts of HSR have
begun to appear on public and policy agendas (Chen et al., 2007; Zhang, 2010). Environmental problems and HSR project
non-compliance have caused government reactions. Between 2010 and 2012, the Ministry of Environmental Protection
(MEP) suspended the construction and operation of 13 high-speed lines that failed to pass environmental impact assess-
ments (EIA) (Yan andWang, 2012). In August 2012, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) promulgated
the Interim Measures on the Social Stability Risk Assessment of Major Fixed Assets Investment Projects, where all projects were
classified as having high, medium, or low risk levels, and only projects with low risk could receive approval by the NDRC.
Increasingly, the Chinese government was also confronted with citizen protests on high-speed railway systems, such as
in Shanghai (2008) and in Chengdu (2009) (He et al., 2015), with the media reporting on citizen protests (Li et al., 2012a,
2012b; Liu et al., 2010). China is only just starting to learn how to cope with environmental protests against infrastructural
projects through experimenting with citizen consultation, participation, and wide-spread, two-way information provisions
(Kostka and Mol, 2013; Lorentzen, 2013; Zhao, 2010).
Currently, public environmental activism is emerging in China regarding various environmental concerns. Citizen con-
cerns and protests regarding the planning and siting of Chinese high-speed railways are rarely studied. This paper addresses
questions of why and how Chinese citizens mobilize for and participate in protests against high-speed railway, and to what
effect. To this end, a comprehensive study was conducted of the decision-making process, public opinions, and protest
actions regarding the plans and siting choices for the Beijing–Shenyang high-speed railway (abbreviated as Jingshen HSR)
from 2008 to 2013, combining quantitative and qualitative methods. This study contributes to our still limited understand-
ing of the nature, scope, and form of environmental activism in contemporary China. The next section introduces Chinese
environmental participation and protest against the background of international literature on this issue. Section ‘Research
methods’ reports on the research methodology. Section ‘The politics of the Jingshen high speed railway’ examines the politics
of decision-making and protests against the Jingshen HSR, followed by an analysis of the public motives for and participation
in protesting. The final section presents the conclusions.Environmental participation and protests in China
Public participation, or stakeholder participation, is the process where stakeholders are involved and included in
decision-making processes so that their concerns, needs, and values are taken into consideration in the result (Cascetta
and Pagliara, 2013). Public participation is a two-way communication and interactive process where information and
viewpoints are exchanged between stakeholders and formal decision-makers. The goal of participation is to achieve a trans-
parent, balanced, and widely supported decision through greater input from stakeholders. In China, the often criticized D
ecide–Announce–Defend (DAD) approach to infrastructure policies and projects, which lacks participation, still prevails
(Shan and Yai, 2011). However, room for hearing concerns, anxieties, and complaints and for individual and collective pro-
tests has expanded over the last decade, especially with respect to environmental issues (Wu, 2013; Johnson, 2013; He et al.,
2014; Ren and Shou, 2013). The Chinese government is slowly starting to implement public participation as a governance
principle and formulating laws and regulations accordingly (He et al., 2013; Zhang et al., 2013). According to the EIA Law
2003 (e.g., Article 5), the public can participate in environmental issues at three different stages of such infrastructure pro-
jects. Before decisions are made, the public (including experts, industrial representatives, and NGOs) should be given the
opportunity to participate in EIAs through a questionnaire organized by the project developer, a public hearing (Article
G. He et al. / Transportation Research Part D 43 (2016) 1–16 311 of the EIA law), and by submitting their comments on the EIA during a publicly announced period. Second, when making
environmental decisions, the public can participate formally via their representatives in the National People’s Congress
(NPC) and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) at various levels. Finally, when decisions have been
made and environmental impacts are actually occurring, the public can voice their grievances by suing polluters in court.
Less formalized forms of participation during all three stages are available by sending complaints to environmental author-
ities through old and new media (via letters, the Internet, or a personal visit) or through what Chinese officials call ‘‘mass
incidents” (public demonstrations, protest meetings, occupations of land, etc.). More recently, citizen environmental partic-
ipation rights found a sound legal basis in the 2014 Environmental Protection Law, with an entirely new chapter on infor-
mation disclosure and participation of citizens in environmental governance (Zhang et al., 2015). The latest Measures for
Public Participation in Environmental Protection (enacted on September 1, 2015) defined the principles and approaches
of participation, rights obligations, and responsibilities of the main parties, and supporting measures. However, the detailed
procedures for public involvement in environmental decision-making are still not fully defined and operationalized.
While the political opportunities for citizen participation in environmental decision-making seems to be increasing,
actual practices show that these participation options are often not fully permitted and are not implemented by (local) gov-
ernmental authorities (Young et al., 2015). Public involvement in development planning has faced widespread suspicion
because it tends to go against the long entrenched bureaucratic culture of China’s authoritarian state. The benefit of and need
for public participation in policy-making and project planning is often not fully recognized, especially by local officials (Xu
and Ding, 2005). Limited forms of participation being implemented in many regions follow from the assumption that the
public still lacks the knowledge and capacity to participate in policy formulation and decision-making. Such an assumption
has led to government- and expert-dominated environmental decision-making processes. In the planning process, it is com-
mon practice of project managers to seek the opinions of a few experts rather than the opinions of the public (Zhao, 2005).
Some experts have analyzed the barriers of effective public participation in China’s environmental management, pointing to
an economic-oriented development mode, the government-dominated socialist ideology, and the Chinese traditional cul-
ture. Public participation in transportation planning cannot yet be considered a consolidated, successful, and fully shared
practice in any stage of the transportation planning process. Shan and Yai (2011) indicated that the factors determining pub-
lic involvement in infrastructure planning include geographical distribution, economic development level, city size, and the
national and/or local regulations, of which the first two are considered the most important.
In the transition toward a socialist market economy, decentralization of decision-making has given the local government
greater freedom and incentives to meet social and public needs. By the same token, citizens are becoming more aware of and
vocal on developments affecting their quality of life. The rise of a well-educated middle class, including people in private
business, legal scholars, and social elites, has strengthened demands for public participation in governmental policy and
decision-making processes. Increasing environmental infringements, increased environmental information disclosure and
accessibility (also through the Internet), and growing legal provisions for participation have increased the opportunities
for environmental activism and protests in China (Ren et al., 2015). The construction of infrastructure often leads to conflicts
between local communities on the one hand and the project implementation organization and higher-level authorities on
the other, resulting in protests and the cancelation or postponement of the project. Several cases of public opposition to
infrastructure projects have been reported, such as projects involving nuclear power, large and small chemical plants, waste
incinerators, land requisition, and wind power (Guo et al., 2015; He, 2006; He et al., 2013; Li et al., 2012b; Liu et al., 2010;
Sun, 2015; Tang et al., 2008; Zhang et al., 2016). Previous studies argued that many factors could affect public resistance or
acceptance of infrastructure projects. These factors included public attitudes toward environmental issues, perceived inter-
ests, direct economic benefits, public perception of the environmental, economic, and social risks, general knowledge about
the issue and the project, environmental costs, and trust in the government and related corporations (He et al., 2013; Mu
et al., 2015; Shi et al., 2015). One of the greatest obstacles to overcome these factors is the public’s low level of public access
to relevant information and decision-making (Mol et al., 2011; He et al., 2015; Hsu et al., 2012). Empirical evidence suggests
that sufficient and reliable information and two-way communication (between the government and communities) would
build citizen trust in governmental agencies, which could enhance public participation in and acceptance of programs
and projects (Sun, 2015; Yang et al., 2014; Yuan et al., 2011).Research methods
Theories and framework
Based on empirical studies fromWestern countries, a range of theories and concepts has been developed over the last fifty
years to explain how and why individuals and communities engage in collective action or protests, such as crowd behavior
theory (Le Bon, 1960), collective action theory and ‘‘free-riding” behavior (Marwell and Oliver, 1993), resource mobilization
theory (e.g. Dalton et al., 2003), political process theory (e.g. Klandermans and Staggenborg, 2002), new social movement
theory (Diani and Donati, 1999), political opportunity (structure) (Rootes, 1998), and social contagion theory (e.g. Scherer
and Cho, 2003). Not all of these frameworks are equally useful and relevant for understanding participation in environmental
protests in contemporary China. From the emerging literature on Chinese environmental protests, we learned that, com-
pared to Western countries, in China, participation in environmental decision-making is organized differently, civil society
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(Zhao, 2010; Li et al., 2012a, 2012b; Lorentzen, 2013; He et al., 2012; Johnson, 2013; Wu, 2013). In this context, several ques-
tions need discussion: how to engage the public in the early stage of the planning process; how to provide qualitative, solid,
and well-documented input in the planning process; how to make the process dynamic and flexible and independent of any
specific (predetermined) planning option; and how to harness the resources that non-governmental actors might bring in
identifying environmental challenges and assisting government in improving environmental performance?
Hence, in our investigation of participation and protests surrounding HSR decision-making, we loosely apply concepts of
resource mobilization, political opportunity structure, and efficacy on motivation, resources, and opportunities for (partici-
pation in) protests to empirically investigate why and with what resources Chinese citizens participate in protests against
HSR decision-making, and estimate the efficacy of these public actions. First, we analyzed the decision-making process of
the Jingshen HSR in detail to see how stakeholders communicate and interact with each other. Second, a public questionnaire
survey and interviews with different actors were conducted to discover the factors determining public involvement in oppo-
sition to the siting and construction of this HSR project. Understanding the challenges in making such a change can provide a
basis for strengthening measures designed to advance participation in addressing wicked environmental policy issues.
Study area
According to the Medium- and Long-Term Railway Network Plan 2005–2020 (approved in 2004 and revised in 2008), the
government will build a grid of HSRs with four east–west lines and four north–south lines. The Jingshen HSR (see Fig. 1)
was listed as one of the four north–south railway lines (Beijing–Harbin HSR). The Jingshen HSR line will relieve a significant
bottleneck in China’s public transportation network between China’s Northeast region and Beijing. Construction was sup-
posed to have started in 2010 but was delayed repeatedly until March 2014 because of protests by residents along the
planned route, especially of those residents close to and in Beijing. Many Beijing citizens along the track resisted this HSR
because of environmental and health impacts such as loss of green space, noise, electromagnetic radiation, and vibrations.
The public protests have resulted in several safety reviews, line changes, and EIA report rejections by the MEP. The Jingshen
HSR was selected as a case study.
This track passes through one municipality and two provinces (Beijing, Hebei, and Liaoning) and has a total length of
698 km. Travel time between Shenyang and Beijing will be reduced from 4 h to 2 h and 17 min, at a speed of 350 km/h.
The one-way planned transmission capacity is 60 million persons per year. The total investment budget in track construction
is 124.5 billion Yuan (approximately 20 billion US dollars), which comes from the CRC, local governments, and bank loans.
The CRC, Beijing, Hebei, and Liaoning have set up a joint venture as the legal entity responsible for project construction
management. The provincial and municipal governments along the line were responsible for land acquisition, relocation
of people, and land clearance within their respective jurisdictions.
Data collection and analysis
To study the public support for and protests against the Jingshen HSR, a mixed-method approach was employed, combin-
ing qualitative and quantitative research. We performed a media and literature search, performed ten semi-structured,
in-depth interviews with different stakeholders, and conducted a survey among 450 residents selected randomly from
different multistory buildings in eight Beijing communities along the Jingshen HSR line.
The questionnaire design was pre-tested in three rounds of face-to-face interviews with 10 experts and 15 local residents
in September and October 2013. The final questionnaire was organized in three sections: (1) socio-demographic character-
istics of the interviewees; (2) information access, public perception on and attitudes toward HSR environmental impacts and
stakeholders’ involvement; and (3) public participation and protest. The survey was conducted in November and DecemberQingtai
Xulan
Huhanrong
Hukun
Jingshen
Jinghu
Jinggang
Hangshen
ShenyangBeijing
Harbin
Fig. 1. The Beijing–Shenyang high-speed railway and surveyed communities in Beijing.
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430 valid questionnaires were returned (response rate of 95%). Table 1 shows the social and demographic information of the
respondents. SPSS was used for statistical analysis of the survey data. Based on existing studies, we defined independent
variables (gender, age, employment, education level, and income) and dependent variables. Our hypothesis was that the
respondents’ social-demographic characteristics such as gender, age, education level, and income affect attitudes toward
HSR effects, as well as motives for and participation in protests. Descriptive statistics and correlation analysis were applied
to analyze the perceptions of and attitudes towards the decision-making process of the HSR project, as well as the motives
and actions regarding the protests.
The qualitative study included in-depth, semi-structured interviews with 10 stakeholders by the first author, including
national and local officials, a company designer, and staff members from a resident committee, an environmental expert,
a real estate broker, protesters, and non-protesters. After consent, each interview lasted 1–1.5 h and was recorded through
field notes. Interview topics were developed in relation to the primary research questions, including HSR planning and siting,
the EIA process and reports, information disclosure, communication between the government/companies and the public, and
public participation in protests and decision-making. In addition, we analyzed documents relating to the Jingshen HSR plans
and the relevant EIA reports.The politics of the Jingshen high speed railway
Decision-making for the Jingshen HSR project
China’s HSR program has a top-down decision-making process that is dominated by governmental agencies and the state-
owned design institute, with rare involvement from the public. Several government agencies play a role in planning and
approving HSR projects. The State Council is the leading organization for strategic policies and planning of HSR development.
The powerful NDRC is responsible for drafting the national HSR development plans, while the former MOR (before March
2013), now the MOT (after March 10, 2013), plays a major role in implementing HSR plans and defining the appropriate
HSR construction projects. The CRC carries out the construction and management of HSR services. The MEP and Ministry
of Water Resources (MWR) are responsible for reviewing and approving EIA reports and the Water and Soil Conservation
Scheme (WSCS), respectively. Local governments and their planning agencies must approve the siting and line schemes in
their jurisdictions.
The Jingshen HSR project took approximately five years from planning to construction. According to the Regulations on
Capital Construction Project Procedures of 1978, a large HSR project should include seven stages: preliminary feasibility study,
feasibility study, investigation and design (initial design and detailed diagram), the preparatory work for construction, con-
struction, completion and acceptance, and post-evaluation. As Fig. 2 shows, the Development and Planning Division of the
(former) MOR issued a notice on the preparation of the Jingshen HSR in 2008 and conducted the pre-feasibility study review
in January 2009.
The draft feasibility report, submitted to the NDRC in 2009, proposed three options for the Beijing section of the Jingshen
HSR line (Fig. 3). The departure location was always set to be at the Beijing Railway Station. Option one and two went north
and then turned east through Xinghuo, Miyun District to Xinglong along the Jingsheng highway and along the Jingmi high-
way, respectively. Option three went east through Tongzhou, Pinggu to Xinglong. The former MOR preferred either of the
first two options, while the Beijing Municipal Commission of Urban Planning (BMCUP) preferred the third option. From
an environmental and health perspective, all three options go through densely populated areas and drinking water protec-
tion areas with severe noise, vibration, and ecological impacts. After negotiations between the MOR and BMCUP, and after
comparing the technical, economic, and environmental impacts, the BMCUP approved the first option in its Opinions on the
Pre-feasibility Study of the Beijing–Shenyang Passenger Railway (No. 1809, 2009) and clarified the siting plan. The NDRC
approved the proposal in March 2009. The 3rd Railway Survey & Design Institute (RSDI) was the responsible agency for
the engineering design, EIA, andWSCS of the Jingshen HSR. Liaoning Co., Ltd. and Jingshen-Jingji Passenger Line Co., Ltd. wereTable 1
Social and demographic background of the respondents (n = 430).
Item Sub-group Percent Item Sub-group Percent
Gender Male 51.2 Education Middle school and below 18.4
Female 48.8 High school 16.3
Age 18–34 29.1 College and University 53.1
35–59 57.6 Graduate school and above 12.2
60 and more 13.3 Households with children Yes 55.8.
Employment Government 10.4 No 44.2
Research institutes and universities 22.7 Monthly income per person (Yuan) Up to 5000 25.4
Enterprise & business 34.3 5001–10,000 35.2
Agriculture 12.7 10,001–20,000 21.2
Retirement 13.1 20,001–30,000 11.7
Self-employed 6.8 More than 30,000 6.5
1/2004 1/2009 3/2009 10/2009 4/2010 12/2010 8–12/2012 8/2013 12/2013 3/2014
Pre-feasibility study 
review meeting; project 
proposal completed by 
former MOR
First EIA 
report rejected 
by the MEP
The NDRC 
approved 
project 
proposal
Feasibility 
report 
completed
Second EIA 
report rejected by 
the MEP
Third EIA 
report 
rejected by 
the MEP
Changed route 
published 
The MWR approved Water and Soil 
Conservation Report; fourth EIA 
report approved by the MEP; 
feasibility report approved by NDRC
HSR construction 
started, planned 
finalization 2019
Listed in 
Medium- and 
Long-Term 
Railway Network 
Plan 2005-2020
3rd protest
4th protest
Public hearing
2nd protest
1st protest
Fig. 2. The decision-making process and public protests regarding the Beijing–Shenyang HSR. Abbreviations: Environmental Impact Assessment, EIA;
Ministry of Environmental Protection, MEP; Ministry of Railway, MOR; Ministry of Water Resources, MWR; National Development and Reform Commission,
NDRC.
Fig. 3. Three proposed options of the Beijing–Shenyang high-speed railway.
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respectively.
This proposed track would go through 34 neighborhoods consisting of over 100,000 citizens in Chaoyang District, Beijing.
The distance between the track and residential buildings would be 20–100 m. Construction of the Jingshen HSR was pro-
posed to start in 2010 and be completed in 2012. However, the feasibility studies, especially the EIA reports, were considered
unacceptable by Beijing citizens and were rejected frequently by the MEP (see below). After more than four years of intense
controversy, debates, and public protests, the construction plan was finalized and approved in December 2013. The total
investment reached 124.5 billion Yuan (approximately 20 billion US dollars), much more than the initial budget in 2009
(70 billion Yuan, approximately 11 billion US dollars). Construction of the Jingshen HSR began in March 2014 and the line
is planned to be in operation in 2019.
The development of public reactions
The siting of the Jingshen HSR project encountered fierce public debate and objections in Beijing. After 2009, tens of thou-
sands of residents along the track conducted four (massive) protests that delayed HSR construction for four years (Table 2).
From March to May 2009, dozens of residents in Jinyu (JF), a neighborhood close to the Jingshen HSR, took part in the first
protest. After the initial feasibility study, the first EIA report was drafted by the 3rd RSDI and the abstract was published
through an unpopular EIA participation website at the beginning of 2009. In a one page summary, the general background
of the project was introduced with only two sentences, while specific engineering schemes, environmental impacts, and
Table 2
Profiling the public protests against the Jingshen HSR in Beijing.
Time Actors & media Key controversies Public actions Government responses Outcomes
March–May 2009  Residents in a new JF
neighborhood
 The distance is very short between the
neighborhood and the track
 Letters of complaint  Open information was not available  The MEP rejected the 1st EIA
report
 The 3rd RSDI  The EIA report summary was insufficient
 MEP
December 2010–
March 2011
 Approximately 400 residents in
a JF neighborhood
 Xinghuo Station was only 100 meters
away from JF and occupied its greenbelt
 Joint public petition
letters
 Former MOR, Jing-Ji Special
Preparatory Group (JSPG), 3rd RSDI and
the related Beijing agencies optimized
the line scheme
 The MEP rejected the 2nd EIA
report
 3rd RSDI  The public was concerned with
environmental impacts
 Public petition letter via
the Internet
 Jingshen HSR project
temporarily halted MEP
 Nine media sources, such as
the China Environmental News
June–December
2012
 Over 100 thousand residents in
34 neighborhoods
 The proposed track was close to
neighborhoods. Environmental impacts
would affect public health
 Letters of complaint  The BMCHUD and CDG organized
three coordination meetings
 Residents were not satisfied
with the responses of the
governmental agencies and
negotiation results
 The 3rd RSDI  High public support rate (94.8%) that the
3rd EIA report was not reliable
 E-mails  Former MOR and five Beijing agencies
jointly discussed and confirmed the
HSR siting plan
 The MEP rejected the 3rd EIA
report
 National ministries such as
MEP, the former MOR, and MWR
 Distance between the route and
residential building is not shown correctly
 Phone calls  The MWR approved WSCS
 JSPG  Incorrect procedures for the EIA publicly
announced were adopted
 Web forums  The 3rd RSDI optimized the line
 Relevant governmental
agencies in Beijing, such as
BMCUP, BMCHUD, Beijing EPB,
and the Chaoyang District
Government (CDG)
 QQ groups  The BMCUP and Beijing EPB replied
officially to the public complaints
 Various media: at least 27
newspapers, 53 websites, QQ
groups, the telephone, blogs, and
Internet forums
 Micro blogs  The JSPG organized two meetings
with representatives
 Plea to the BMCUP  The MEP published the first full EIA
report available to public
 Signatures for a re-
survey of the EIA
 The BMCUP communicated with
some representatives
 Organized a voluntary
Gaotie Weiquan Union
 The staff of the former MOR met with
five resident representatives
 Demonstration (more
than 1000 residents)
August–December
2013
 Over 10 thousand residents in
6 communities
 Residents are not satisfied with the
optimized Jingshen HSR line
 Petition letter to the
MEP
 The CRC, BMCUP, and 3rd RSDI
announced the optimized program
 The MEP approved the 4th EIA
report
 3rd RSDI  The revised HSR still caused
environmental and health effects on
nearby residents
 Four face-to-face
meetings
 Jing-Jin-Ji Company, 3rd RSDI, Beijing
EPB, BMCUP, and the CDG organized
four meetings
 NDRC and CRC approved the
feasibility study report
 MEP, NDRC, CRC  Residents appealed for a complete
revision of the Jingshen rail line
 Submitted 1035
comments to BMCUP
 The 3rd RSDI published the 3rd EIA
report
 Construction began on the
Jingshen HSR in March 2014
 JSPG  The BMCUP publicized the
optimization scheme, invited public
comment, and responded to public
suggestions
 BMCUP, Beijing EPB, CDG, and
township governments
 The MEP held a hearing on the new
EIA report
 Various media: 12 newspapers,
60 websites, QQ groups, and
Internet forums
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the first EIA report summary. The JF neighborhood is one of the dozens of communities near the proposed Jingshen HSR.
Some residents of JF found that the proposed HSR was very close to their homes and would occupy part of the green space.
They worried about the reduction of public space in the neighborhood and the short distance between their homes and
Xinhuo Station. Other residents were concerned over being uninformed about the EIA and project decisions. The residents
sent five written complaints to several governmental agencies including the MEP. Finally, the MEP rejected the EIA report
for reasons of superficial and incomplete environmental impact assessment information, failure to disseminate information,
and lack of public participation.
From December 2010 to March 2011, approximately 400 residents in the JF neighborhood participated in a second protest
against the HSR. In the second EIA report summary made public to the residents, information was available on the introduc-
tion of the project (place, time, railway stations, investment amount, and options), key environmental impacts, environmen-
tal protection measures, and preliminary evaluation findings. Because of the low rate of HSR support in Beijing, the former
MOR, the Jing-Ji Special Preparatory Group (JSPG), the 3rd RSDI, and the related Beijing agencies optimized the line scheme
and designed a number of environmental protection measures, such as 3 km of sound-proof shields, reduced train speeds of
80 km/h in Beijing, relocation of Xinghuo Station outside the greenbelt of JF, and building an 8.7 km tunnel to prevent land
use impacts in Huanggang village. However, the JF residents worried about the impacts of noise, vibration, radiation, and the
loss of green space in the neighborhood. Additional concerns were related to the safety of above-ground and underground
facility construction, land pollution, air pollution, and waste. Along the entire line in the two provinces, about 6% of the res-
idents opposed the Jingshen HSR and in Beijing even 24%, according to the second EIA report. Opponents submitted petition
letters to the 3rd RSDI, the NPC, the State Council, the CPPCC, the NDRC, the MEP, the Ministry of Health (MOH), the Beijing
Municipal Government (BMG), and the BMCUP on December 17, 2010. Netizens posted the petition letter to the 3rd RSDI on
the Internet (on the forum of the People’s Website, http://www.people.com.cn/). The MEP also rejected the second EIA
report, as it found the report incomplete and the complaints of JF residents justified. On July 23, 2011, two high-speed trains
collided in Wenzhou, Zhejiang province. It was the first fatal crash involving HSRs in China (at least 40 people died and 192
were injured). The accident had a profound impact on the development of HSRs in China (Fan et al., 2015). The train crash
sparked public anger over the safety of high-speed trains in China. Public confidence in HSRs eroded, leading to lower num-
ber of passengers. In response to the accident and public concern, a comprehensive railway safety review was conducted,
operation speeds of major HSR lines were reduced, the top official in the MOR was fired, and construction of several
high-speed rail lines was temporarily halted. The Jingshen HSR project was also shelved temporarily after the ‘‘7/23”
Wenzhou train incident.
Between July 15 and 25, 2012, the 3rd RSDI conducted a public survey in 34 residential communities of Chaoyang District,
Beijing. The results showed that 94.8% of the 2782 interviewed residents supported the Jingshen HSR construction. The invi-
tation for public comments on the third EIA report was published in the daily Beijing Evening News and the Beijing News on
August 15, 2012. The MEP (2012) publicly released the full third EIA report of the Jingshen HSR on November 16, 2012. The
third EIA report provided details on the project overview, line engineering selection and optimization measures, environ-
mental impacts and projected preventive measures, and public participation and support. Beijing residents criticized the
high rate of public support of the EIA because pollsters only surveyed on the installation of sound-proof shields. Over ten
thousand residents discussed the Jingshen HSR environmental impacts through Internet forums, QQ groups (QQ, similar
to Facebook in Western countries, is an instant messaging software service developed by a Chinese company), and micro-
blogs, and then asked for revisions. A rerouting suggestion was developed during brainstorming discussions. From August
2012, opponents filed complaints to the national and Beijing governmental agencies (the NDRC, the MEP, the former
MOR, the JSPG, the Beijing Municipal Government (BMG), and four related agencies) in the form of letters, E-mails, and
phone calls. Activists in five neighborhoods organized the collection of signatures for a petition to redo the EIA and collected
public opinions on the Jingshen HSR. In 14 neighborhoods, residents organized a new, voluntary action organization, the
Gaotie Weiquan Union (a group protecting and defending citizen rights not to be affected by the high-speed railway). More
than 50 resident representatives of the Union held a meeting to call for residents’ opinions and organized opposing actions
such as Internet appeals, letters of complaint, and a demonstration. On November 29, dozens of residents went to the BMCUP
and waved banners with their requests. Over 1000 largely middle-class protesters (mostly young people) from sixteen
neighborhoods along the planned track held a peaceful demonstration on December 9, 2012. They opposed the siting plan
of the Jingshen HSR and the fraudulent EIA public survey and asked for the relocation of the Jingshen rail line outside their
neighborhoods and to move the station outside the 5th ring road to a less populated area. The national and Beijing govern-
mental agencies held manymeetings and communicated often with representatives of the residents. However, an agreement
was not reached and the residents did not consider the communication process and results to be satisfactory. For example,
MOR staff addressed residents in a friendly manner, but they avoided discussing core controversies such as revision of the
Jingshen HSR siting and preventive measures for the environmental impacts. Overall, compared to the second round of pro-
tests, the action repertoire of the protesters broadened. Residents began collecting ‘‘real” opinions of citizens, complaining to
governmental agencies, disseminating information to neighboring communities, mobilizing citizens, and finally organizing a
collective demonstration on December 9, 2012. The third EIA report was rejected by the MEP in January 2013 because of the
growing and constant complaints and protests of more and more residents in communities along the Jingshen HSR.
After the third rejection of the EIA report, the responsible governmental agencies and the 3rd RSDI attempted to further
intensify communications with the residents. On July 30, 2013, a proposed public meeting with a residential committee was
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section between the Beijing Railway Station and the Xinghuo Station was cancelled. Xinghuo Station became a new starting
point and six new environmental protection measures were proposed. This significantly reduced the number of affected Bei-
jing residents living along the train track. Still, over 10 thousand residents in six neighborhoods live along the train track
north of Xinghuo Station. These residents remained concerned about environmental and health effects. They claimed that
the aim of the revision was only to get EIA approval and less about reducing impacts. These residents appealed and proposed
the following three additional changes to the Jingshen rail line: (1) locating the starting station outside the fifth ring road; (2)
relocating the HSR line outside densely populated areas (with a minimum distance of 200 m from houses); and (3) if the first
suggestion proved impossible, the construction of an underground track between Xinghuo Station and the fifth ring road.
More than 300 opponents sent a petition letter to the MEP on August 5, 2013. Government representatives attended four
face-to-face meetings in different communities, where residents submitted 1035 suggestions/adaptations to the Jingshen
HSR plan publicized by the BMCUP. However, the BMCUP refused to revise further the Jingshen HSR plan. After a public hear-
ing, the MEP finally approved the fourth EIA report of the Jingshen HSR on December 4, 2013, and construction of the Jing-
shen HSR started in March 2014. In the approved EIA report, Xinghuo Station was defined as the starting point of the
Jingshen HSR and the option one (see Fig. 3) was adopted. The track between the Beijing Railway Station and Xinghuo Station
was cancelled in order to avoid impacts on more than 100,000 people living close to the line.Public engagement and stakeholders’ communications in the protests
According to the available data, the first two protests were not very well known to the general public and were not
reported by the relevant media (Fig. 4). Only residents of one directly affected neighborhood took part in the protests.
The MEP, the 3rd RSDI, the MOR, and the JSPG had limited communication through letters and face-to-face meetings with
the residents.
The third protest was the most influential in terms of the number of neighborhoods involved in the protest (34), partic-
ipants directly involved in the protest (about 2000), the number of governmental agencies and companies directly engaged
in meetings with the residents (17), and the number of newspapers and websites that reported on the Jingshen HSR and
related public protests (83). Governmental organizations and opposing citizens held eight face-to-face meetings, resulting
in a better understanding of mutual opinions. The public used a demonstration to show their disagreement with the inert-
ness of governments and companies.
During the fourth and final protest, the number of participating neighborhoods and protesters, and reporting of the pro-
tests in newspapers and on websites decreased. The number of discussions, meetings, and communications between govern-
mental agencies/companies and the public were also reduced.Participants, attitudes, and motives regarding the Jingshen HSR protests
How could decision-making on the Jingshen HSR become so difficult, resulting in such a long delay and so much protest?
One of the main factors was the diverging concerns of the primary actors. This was most notable in the form of the
authorities in charge of the HSR planning and siting ignoring the concerns of Beijing citizens living along the track. Social
acceptance is a major institutional risk in large infrastructure projects. The level of social acceptance of infrastructure
projects depends on how the benefits to and impacts on stakeholder groups are influenced by the project design from a
long-term perspective (Miller and Lessard, 2001; Yuan et al., 2011). Decision-makers need not only balance the development
rights and interests at the national and local level, but they should also consider public opinion and interests such as privateFig. 4. Resident involvement and communications in public protests against the Jingshen HSR.
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impacts of proposed projects (Mu et al., 2015; Shan and Yai, 2011).
In-depth interviews with governmental representatives at the national and local level showed that they were preoccu-
pied with the success of Jingshen HSR construction, both for the country’s economic benefits and for their personal careers.
Of these agencies, only the MEP showed a broader interest in the environmental and health side effects of the HSR. Design
and construction companies and their managers primarily focused on costs, budget, technological feasibility, engineering
schedules, as well as changing state policies. Investors—both national and local—were interested in opportunities to invest
and economic profits. Infrastructure projects have been a favored target of many investors because of high rates of retur-
n on these investments in China. Very few of them actually focused on the local side effects for citizens living along the
planned HSR track. Hence, initially, little effort was put toward increasing involvement of local citizens in the decision-
making process.Public attitudes towards Jingshen HSR impacts and decision-making
The history of environmental conflict shows that public support for projects with potential environmental change is
determined not only by the perceived effects, but also by the decision-making process and by communication strategies
(Buijs, 2009; Lewicki and Gray, 2003). Residents in the communities affected by the HSR track were not uniform in their atti-
tudes towards the construction of the Jingshen HSR. Our survey results are shown in Fig. 5. Almost 63% of the Beijing respon-
dents valued the regional economic benefits of the Jingshen HSR construction. About 25% of the respondents believed that
the planning and siting process for the Jingshen HSR was based on a sound scientific investigation and feasibility study. How-
ever, the vast majority (90%) believed that the HSR would also cause human health impacts from radiation. Only 20%, 15%,
and 9% of the residents considered the explanation and responses of the experts, the government, and enterprises to be
timely, adequate, and suitable, respectively. Additionally, most citizens (80%) did not think that their ideas and suggestions
on the Jingshen HSR line were taken seriously or were accepted and/or implemented by governmental agencies and enter-
prises. A minority of respondents accepted the process, results, and the MEP’s final decision on the EIA report (11%).
In our study, approximately 70% of respondents in the eight surveyed Beijing communities had major problems with con-
struction of the Jingshen HSR being near their homes and only 16% supported the construction, which was less than those
living along the Beijing–Shanghai HSR (38% support) (He et al., 2015). The Spearman correlation analysis showed that the
attitudes towards the HSR were more positive among older (p < 0.05), highly educated (p < 0.05), low income (p < 0.05),
and childless residents (p < 0.05), as well as those living at far distance from high-speed lines (p < 0.01). Over 82% of the
respondents thought that it was safe to live at least half a kilometer from the HSR line; the most preferable safe distance
was over 2 km (47%). Gender and employment had no influence on attitudes towards the HSR. Citizens in Beijing along
the planned track had a clear idea of who would profit most from the new HSR line. The construction and operation com-
panies would benefit greatly from the HSR (30%) followed by local governments (28%), the central government (14%), and
business people (12%), while local residents (6%) and future generations (5%) were not believed to be groups that would ben-
efit significantly.
Beijing residents were also critical regarding the information provisioning, communication, and decision-making process
on the Jingshen HSR. Specific knowledge on the Jingshen HSR was limited for the general public and was not provided by the
authorities. Most respondents obtained knowledge regarding this project over the past two years because of public protest
activities. Nearly 40% and 35% of the respondents heard of the Jingshen HSR for the first time in 2012 and 2013, respectively,Fig. 5. Public attitudes toward stakeholders involved in the siting choices for the Jingshen HSR (n = 430).
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and social impacts of the HSR, the public relied significantly on relatives and friends (37%), the Internet (21%), television pro-
grams (18%), and newspapers (15%). Only a few respondents received information from governmental agencies (6%), or com-
panies, research institutes and universities, and NGOs (<2.0%).
Based on our survey, nearly 71% of the respondents considered decision-making on the Jingshen HSR to be ‘‘closed,” while
only 12% of the respondents perceived it to be ‘‘fully/partly transparent.” Only about 2% and 0.7% of the respondents consid-
ered communication between the government and the public, and between railway companies and the public, respectively,
to be sufficient. Almost half of the respondents experienced no communication from these parties regarding HSR construc-
tion. Approximately 40% of the respondents knew of the Jingshen HSR EIA and 14% of the respondents participated in it. Only
26% of the respondents had heard of the public notice for any of the EIA reports.Participants and motives regarding the protests
Over two thirds (68%) of the respondents heard about the self-organized resident demonstration and agreed with and
supported the protests against the Jinshen HSR (Fig. 6). Although right-to-know and participation are becoming general gov-
ernance principles in China, there is a gap between these principles and practice. Our survey found that more than 85% of the
respondents would like to express their opinion to the government, and 81% identified protest as a helpful approach to
defend their interests. While most respondents thought protesters behaved rationally and legally (72%), they also recognized
that the protestors took a great risk (68%) (e.g., potential dangers when demonstrators decide to escalate their protests
beyond what is legally permitted) and paid considerable costs (55%) such as time spent to mobilize residents and to com-
municate with governmental agencies and companies and money spent for booklets, leaflets, banners, etc.
Nearly 25% (108) of the respondents participated in the protests and only a minority (nine people) played a role of orga-
nizer or leader. The Pearson correlation analysis indicated that respondents with a higher education level (r = 0.105, p < 0.05),
lower income level (r = 0.197, p < 0.01), and young to middle-aged citizens (r = 0.121, p < 0.05) were significantly more
likely to participate in protest activities. Gender and profession of the respondents had no significant correlation with their
participation in protest actions. Many protest activities of residents were enabled by the integration of the Internet into
everyday life, which substantially increased project visibility, information accessibility, and communication among residents
and with governmental agencies. The protesters used new media such as Internet forums, QQ chats and e-mail, micro-blogs,
and micro-messages as the primary media for communicating their opinions and comments, followed by the formal written
complaints to governments and industrial sectors, letters to conventional media (television, radio, and newspapers), and pri-
vate discussions with friends and family members. New media were also perceived as more influential than conventional
media in the public protests. Of the new media, over half of the protesters preferred micro-messages, micro blogs, and
QQ groups (Fig. 7).
Previous studies showed that among the primary reasons for the public to oppose infrastructure projects in China were
economic issues such as low level of compensation for land occupation and displaced people (Mu et al., 2015). During theFig. 6. Public opinion on self-organized protests regarding routing of the Jingshen HSR (n = 430).
Fig. 7. Public opinions on the role of new media in the Jingshen HSR protests (n = 108).
Table 3
The reasons for public participation in protests against the Jingshen HSR.
Reasons for protests Mean Standard
deviation
 My family and I will be affected by the proposed Jingshen HSR (in our living environment, health, and home values) 4.32 0.71
 My relatives and neighbors will be affected by the proposed Jingshen HSR (in their living environment, health, and
home values)
3.04 0.97
 I participated because it is my responsibility as a citizen 4.14 1.34
 The proposed Jingshen HSR is unfair in its effects for different residents 4.19 1.27
 The decision-making process of the Jingshen HSR is not transparent to the public, which infringes upon my right-to-
know
3.95 1.02
 The EIA process of the Jingshen HSR did not comply with the national EIA law and regulations 2.89 1.56
 The design company did not disclose to the public the real environmental and health impacts of the Jingshen HSR 4.08 1.17
 I do not trust the information on the Jingshen HSR provided by governmental agencies and companies 4.17 1.48
 I only follow other people in participating in the protest 2.85 1.16
Note: Valid N = 108; All variables on a scale ranging from 1 = not at all to 5 = very much.
Fig. 8. The gender, age, education level and income of non-participants in the Jingshen HSR protests (n = 322).
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tructure projects (Chen and Hua, 2015; Guo et al., 2015; He et al., 2013, 2014, 2015; Shi et al., 2015). We investigated the
reasons for protesting through a questionnaire, where all items were measured on a Likert-type scale, ranging from 1
(not at all) to 5 (very much) (Table 3). The most agreed upon reasons to participate in protests were ‘‘My family and I will
be affected by the proposed Jingshen HSR, such as the living environment, health, and home values,” ‘‘The proposed Jingshen
HSR is unfair in its effects for different residents,” and ‘‘I do not trust in the information on the Jingshen HSR provided by
governmental agencies and companies.” This indicated that private interests were important in this public action, typical
Table 4
The reasons for public non-involvement in opposition to the Jingshen HSR (n = 322).
Reasons for non-involvement in the protests Percent (%)
 Public protests are useless to influence governmental decision-making 31
 Rational and legal means are more effective in solving problems 18
 I was not affected by the new HSR 15
 I do not mind sacrificing personal interests for regional development 14
 I am not willing to confront the government because it is powerful 9
 I had no time to attend 7
 I supported the governmental decision 4
G. He et al. / Transportation Research Part D 43 (2016) 1–16 13for the NIMBY phenomena. The least mentioned reasons for protesting were ‘‘I only follow other people in participating in
the protest,” ‘‘The EIA process of the Jingshen HSR did not comply with the national EIA law and regulations,” and ‘‘My rel-
atives and neighbors will be affected by the proposed Jingshen HSR including their living environment, health, and home
values.”
More than 75% respondents did not join the opposition against the Jingshen HSR. As Fig. 8 showed, females and males
were 52% and 48% of the non-participants. The non-participants with middle & high school, college, and Master degrees were
40%, 44% and 16%, respectively. Respondents older than 30 years accounted for 75% of the non-participants, and the monthly
income per household of the majority of non-participants (66%) was less than 1600 US dollars (10,000 RMB).
Respondents who did not take part in the protests had several reasons, among which the first three were: ‘‘Public protests
are useless to influence governmental decision-making,” ‘‘Rational and legal means are more effective in solving problems
than illegal actions,” ‘‘I was not affected by the Jingshen HSR.” A minority of respondents supported the governmental deci-
sion (4%) (see Table 4).
For those non-participants in the protests, 84% would agree with HSR construction if the government and companies took
adequate measures to reduce its impacts. These measures included the environmental prevention and control facilities on
the ground (26%), a green isolation belt between the track and their homes (15%), a partial underground line (14%), economic
compensation for residents along the HSR line (13%), relocation of citizens to a distance of at least 200 m from the railway
(9%), and the building of welfare facilities (7%). The opponents’ positions and attitudes could change if the governments and
enterprises took effective measures.
In summary, there was a gap between the public attitudes and actions in this case. Approximately 70% of the respondents
in Beijing had negative attitudes of constructing the Jingshen HSR nearby their homes. The attitudes towards the Jingshen
HSR were more positive among older, highly educated, low income, and childless residents, as well as those living far dis-
tances from high-speed lines. In practice, only 25% of the respondents participated in the protests against the construction
of the Jingshen HSR. The participants were those with a higher education level, lower income level, and young to middle-
aged citizens. It seems a little contradictory that the supporters of the HSR project with higher education level and lower
income level still took part in the opposing action. One explanation was that they did not oppose the project itself. They
could accept it if some measures were taken.Conclusion
The question as to why and how people engage in protests has engaged Western social scientists for at least four decades,
but has only recently started to interest Chinese governmental decision-makers following disputes and protests that accom-
panied the rapid expansion of industries and infrastructure (including transport projects) in China. China has often been
labeled a typical ‘‘authoritarian” or ‘‘paternalistic” state, where policies and goals were made largely by the central govern-
ment while actual implementation depended on local authorities (Zhu et al., 2015). Lack of local incentives for adequate
implementation, deficient central supervision, and absence of citizen participation and engagement have been blamed for
poor implementation and enforcement of these policies and goals (Zhang et al., 2016). Many megaprojects (e.g., the Three
Gorges Dam project) have been built in China without much consideration for the concerns of local residents, resulting in
increasing public opposition against large projects. Over the last decade, transportation agencies in China—similar to those
in other countries—have started to employ preventive and compensation measures, such as avoidance of sensitive areas
through alternative routes, costly tunnels and bridges, innovative engineering measures, sound screens, and incorporating
track design in the landscape. However, these measures were not implemented as easily and smoothly as one might hope
or expect. It is not only that many challenges remain in addressing cumulative health and environmental impacts of major
infrastructure projects, but environmental and health improvements of such projects, more than incidentally, occur after
major public controversies and conflicts. The Chinese government has to improve the quality of public consultation and par-
ticipation to avoid such confrontations. The planning and siting of the Jingshen HSR is illustrative in this sense.
Around the world, decision-making regarding complex and wicked environmental problems has shifted from hierarchy to
policy networks, acknowledging the interests, knowledge, and input from different stakeholders by including a wide variety
of organizations and actors (Weber and Khademian, 2008). Following this global trend, the central Chinese government has
started to experiment with and facilitate public participation in environmental decision-making by mandatory environmen-
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Obviously, there was a difference between the ideas and strategies of central level (environmental) policy-makers, and
the implementation in concrete local infrastructure projects. This study showed how hierarchical decision-making caused
continuous public protests against, and the subsequent delay and adaptation of a major infrastructure project. Closed
decision-making and non-compliance with EIA procedures became the primary target of public protests, in addition to con-
cerns regarding real estate depreciation and safety issues (Fan et al., 2015). While the Jingshen HSR project does promote
regional economic development and provides convenient transportation for many people, its initial planning did not involve
the communities that had to bear significant side effects. Through their protests, Beijing residents have managed to secure
significant concessions, a tendency that could be witnessed in other Chinese infrastructure cases. In recent years, officials in
Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and other cities have (partially) given into public pressure, street demonstrations, silent
‘‘strolls” and online campaigns on controversial environmental issues. In various cases, government planners had to adapt,
relocate, or even abandon plans to build transportation infrastructure, chemical plants, and waste incinerators when resi-
dents expressed concerns over environmental and health hazards (Liu et al., 2010; Li et al., 2012a; Johnson, 2013; He
et al., 2014). Residents have become aware that there is currently a window of opportunity for protests to change such pro-
jects and plans. The rather gentle handling of these potentially explosive mass actions contrasts starkly with the harsh crack-
down on other, non-environmental controversies in China.
The overall lack of institutionalized channels for the public to participate and voice their concerns in environmental gov-
ernance and policy-making and implementation often leads to exacerbation of the grievance, including large-scale street
movements. Local protests of Beijing citizens against the Jingshen HSR lasted four and a half years and grew from the private
complaints of a small group of residents in one community to a large-scale public demonstration, media campaigning and
protesting, and the involvement of many communities. With that, and in line with other recent literature on Chinese envi-
ronmental protests, the action repertoire of Chinese environmental activists is diversifying and reflecting, to some extent,
that of Western countries, although in the Jingshen HSR case it remained solidly within what was legally and politically per-
mitted. Although there was no evidence that the MEP actively supported the protests and the MEP did finally approve the
(fourth) EIA as a result of the protests of a group of residents, the MEP and protesting residents were temporary allies in their
goals to improve the environmental and health performance of the HSR, against other national ministries, agencies, compa-
nies, and local authorities. From this perspective, public opposition could be interpreted as a disciplinary mechanism that
conditions society to think and act in particular ways. This is especially true for national developments that have adverse
local impacts. Local place-based action campaigns may only survive and have an impact when critical translocal links are
forged (see also Rozema et al., 2015).
This HSR protest case also illustrated that modern information and communication technologies (the Internet and cell
phones) have become an increasingly important part of the arsenal of Chinese protesters and governments. Some environ-
mental protests occur almost entirely in the realm of online activism and engagement, taking the form of citizens signing
online petitions and issuing online statements in support of alternatives. The surge of cyber-vigilantes also reflects a public
that is better informed and more active in seeking redress for their grievances. At the same time, new information technol-
ogy has increased the power of national and local authorities, creating space for policy innovations and opening up the polit-
ical opportunity structure. The government can (and to some extent does) play a more active role in Internet discussions, as
well as in Internet censorship. New media both increases the scope of the mobilizers and the mobilized (thereby creating
new social capital) and provides the government with a new means of social influence and control (thereby limiting the
political impact of growing social capital).
In order to avoid dilemmas as in the Jingshen HSR case, some strategies and measures need to be considered. Firstly,
stakeholders should be involved in the early stage of the planning process of a HSR project, even under the condition of
dominant top-down decision-making process in China. In general, most local residents proved supportive of the Jingshen
HSR project construction, but they contested the closed decision-making process and the poor design and siting choices
for the track by governmental authorities and companies. Therefore, the central and local governments and companies
should communicate with the public, directly or indirectly, as an essential element of modern risk governance. It needs a
great deal of time and energy to solve the problem if a passive response strategy is taken just, as in the case of the Jingshen
HSR. Secondly, the overall quality of environmental information disclosure on HSR (siting options, the EIA reports, and the
negative environmental impacts of the project) by governmental agencies or companies needs improvement in terms of ade-
quacy, reliability, credibility, timeliness, and usefulness. The poor quality of the EIA reports of the Jingshen HSR was blamed
repeatedly by the public and became a catalyst of public action. Providing reliable, solid, and well-documented information
to the public would facilitate the planning process and the sharing of ideas and requirements from the different stakeholders.
Thirdly, the role of the new media should be considered in communication efforts among different actors. Modern
information and communication technologies have been employed frequently by the public in the Jingshen HSR protest case.
It also illustrated that the Internet and cell phones have become an increasingly important part of the arsenal of Chinese
protesters and governments. Harnessing the resources that non-governmental actors might bring in identifying environmen-
tal challenges would assist governmental authorities in improving environmental decision-making and performance of
large-scale infrastructure projects, such as the Jingshen HSR project. All in all, the effectiveness of public participation
partially depends on the organizational, technical, and political willingness and capacity of the state to respond to public
demands.
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